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ROBBERY, RECIDIVISM, AND THE LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
RICHARD WRIGHT*,WILLIAM J. SABOL**, & THADDEUS L. JOHNSON***
The roughly 175,000 convicted robbers currently serving time in the U.S.
eventually will be released. Over half of them will have been there before.
Locked up as mostly young men and women, they will return to the communities
they left behind, possessing little more than a criminal record and the clothes
on their back. Many will find themselves owing supervision fees to the state;
almost all will face legal barriers to employment, decent housing, political
participation, and other sources of social inclusion. What can the criminal
justice system—a system designed to prevent and deter lawbreaking—
realistically do to keep them from returning to prison? This Article explores
that question by drawing on published accounts from a sample of 86 individuals
actively involved in committing armed robberies, many of whom have returned
to crime after being released from prison. The emphasis throughout is on the
ways in which pervasive social exclusion, both a cause and a consequence of
their lawbreaking, challenges our ability to “reintegrate” such offenders who
in reality were not integrated to begin with.
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I. THE FACTS OF ROBBERY
Robbery is one of the nation’s most feared crimes.1 Perhaps the
quintessential predatory street crime, robbery involves the face-to-face taking
of goods by force or threat of force, typically by an unknown assailant.2
Firearms frequently are brandished by offenders during robberies, heightening
the perceived risk of serious injury or death.3 The racial dynamics of robbery
also play a part in fueling the fear the offense engenders in the population.4 In
contrast to other types of criminal violence, robbery frequently is an interracial
event involving a white victim and a black offender.5 As such, the offense can
instigate and reinforce racial stereotypes of blacks as being predatory and
violent.6 Indeed, Hacker argues that interracial robberies have served to
exacerbate racial tensions and prejudice in America’s cities: “For white victims
caught in interracial robberies the loss of cash or valuables is seldom their chief
concern. Rather, the racial character of the encounter defines the experience.”7
Public fear of robbery has far-reaching consequences, powerfully
influencing people’s daily routines.8 In this sense, robbery has come to
symbolize the chilling effect that fear of crime has on urban conviviality. As
Conklin has observed, “Although the public certainly fears murder and rape, it
is probably fear of robbery . . . which keeps people off the streets, makes them
avoid strangers, and leads them to lock their doors.”9 That fear, while
sometimes overblown, is not wholly unwarranted. Roughly one third of

1. Anthony A. Braga, David M. Hureau, & Andrew V. Papachristos, The Relevance of Micro
Places to Citywide Robbery Trends: A Longitudinal Analysis of Robbery Incidents at Street Corners
and Block Faces in Boston, 48 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 8 (2011).
2. RICHARD T. WRIGHT & SCOTT H. DECKER, ARMED ROBBERS IN ACTION: STICKUPS AND
STREET CULTURE 3 (1997).
3. Id.
4. Craig St. John & Tamara Heald‐Moore, Racial Prejudice and Fear of Criminal Victimization
by Strangers in Public Settings, 66 SOC. INQUIRY 267, 270–71 (1996).
5. Philip J. Cook, Robbery, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 102,
107 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009). For a nuanced discussion of the racial dynamics of robbery, see
BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY & RAJIV SETHI, SHADOWS OF DOUBT: STEREOTYPES, CRIME, AND THE
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 53 (2019).
6. WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 7.
7. ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 187
(1992).
8. Philip J. Cook, Robbery Violence, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 357, 357 (1987); James Q.
Wilson & Barbara Boland, Crime, in THE URBAN PREDICAMENT 179, 191 (William Gorham & Nathan
Glazer eds., 1976).
9. JOHN E. CONKLIN, ROBBERY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (1972).

WRIGHT_20APR20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

4/20/2020 11:06 PM

1181

robbery victims are injured during the attack.10 Most of those injuries are
minor, but at the other extreme between five and ten percent of murders result
from a robbery.11
Given all of the above, it is unsurprising that individuals convicted of
robbery, especially armed robbery, can expect to receive a long prison
sentence.12 According to data from the National Corrections Reporting
Program, about 30% of convicted robbers receive a maximum sentence of 5 to
greater than 10 years; 25% receive 10 to more than 25 years, and another 20%
get 25 years or more.13 In our home state of Georgia, penalties for armed
robbery range anywhere from a minimum sentence of 10 years to a maximum
of life imprisonment.14 Research shows that these lengthy sentences are
sufficient to alter the criminal calculus of most individuals currently serving
time for armed robbery—at least while they are locked up. A survey of
incarcerated armed robbers conducted by Figgie International found that only
27% of them thought the offense was worth the risk, whereas presumably 100%
of them believed it was worth the risk when they committed the stick-up that
landed them in prison.15
The widely shared perceived pain of long-term imprisonment
notwithstanding, we know that over three-quarters of robbers released from
prison will return within five years; some for robbery, but most for drug or

10. NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool (NVAT), BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nvat
[https://perma.cc/MF3Q-3N4F]
[hereinafter
NCVS
Victimization Analysis Tool (NVAT)] (follow the “Custom Tables” hyperlink; select “Personal
Victimization” as the Victimization Type; select the “Robbery” check box; select “Injury” as the First
Variable; and select “Generate Results”).
11. See generally FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM
DATA:
SUPPLEMENTARY
HOMICIDE
REPORTS,
2015
(2017),
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/36790/summary
[https://perma.cc/MW8J2BQV]; FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM DATA: OFFENSES
KNOWN
AND
CLEARANCES
BY
ARREST,
2015
(2017),
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/36789
[https://perma.cc/8DJU-Q5XT]
[hereinafter OFFENSES KNOWN AND CLEARANCES BY ARREST, 2015].
12. See Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements: Changing Policies to Address Disparities,
CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 16, 18.
13. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CORRECTIONS REPORTING
PROGRAM,
1991–2016:
SELECTED
VARIABLES
(2018),
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/37021 [https://perma.cc/N88Y-8KYM]. The
data include all NCRP participating states, covering the period from 2000 to 2016.
14. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-41(b) (2011).
15. FIGGIE INT’L INC., THE FIGGIE REPORT PART VI: THE BUSINESS OF CRIME: THE CRIMINAL
PERSPECTIVE, at VII (1988).
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income-generating property crimes or for traffic and court-related offenses or
for technical violations.16
Violent offenders, including those serving time for robbery, have been
mostly left out of the recent decarceration movement.17 Lamenting this state of
affairs, offenders’ rights activist and former felon Bruce Reilly told the New
York Times, “The drug offender—that person should not even be in
jail . . . The hard questions are reintegration for people the criminal justice
system was actually designed for,” by which he clearly meant those convicted
of serious violence.18 At some point, the over 175,000 convicted robbers
currently incarcerated will be released from prison.19 Over half of them will
have been there before.20 Locked up as young men and women, they will return
16. MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER, & HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005:
PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010, at 7–9 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MN7S-KA4G]; PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 8–9 (2002),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7EL-R4XD]. A substantial period
of time has passed since this report was first published. Yet given the longitudinal stability in the
national recidivism rates, see Joshua Hall, Kaitlyn Harger, & Dean Stansel, Economic Freedom and
Recidivism: Evidence from US States, 21 INT’L. ADVANCES ECON. RES. 155, 156 (2015), scholars
widely consider it among the most reliable assessments in circulation, see Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl
Lero Jonson, & Daniel S. Nagin, Prisons Do Not Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring
Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S, 53S (2011). Notably, this was the last BJS recidivism report to list violent
offenses separately, making it difficult to discern current offending trends among persons formerly
incarcerated for robbery. Despite the extant data structure challenges, estimates show that on the high
end, no more than one third return to prison for another robbery or other predatory offense. LANGAN
& LEVIN, supra, at 9. See generally id. for more details.
17. Noam Scheiber, He Committed Murder. Then He Graduated from an Elite Law School.
Would You Hire Him as Your Attorney?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/02/business/bruce-reilly-murder-conviction-lawyer.html
[https://perma.cc/WVS8-NQ7G]; see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Parole, Good-Time Credits,
and Crowded Prisons: Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 13 (2013).
18. Scheiber, supra note 17.
19. JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2017, at 22 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GC64-KFUG].
20. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF
INMATES IN STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, [UNITED STATES], 2004 (2018)
[hereinafter SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES],
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/4572 [https://perma.cc/2RCE-644Q]; BRIAN
A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN
LARGE
URBAN
COUNTIES,
2009
STATISTICAL
TABLES
10
(2013),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA4D-GW5Z]. These are the
most recent BJS data and reports containing information on prior convictions and incarcerations of
robbery offenders.
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to the communities they left behind, possessing little more than a prison record
and the clothes on their back. Many will find themselves owing supervision
fees to the state; almost all will face legal barriers to employment, decent
housing, political participation, and other sources of social inclusion.21 What
can the criminal justice system—a system designed to prevent and deter
lawbreaking—realistically do to keep them from returning to prison?
This Article explores the prospects of reducing recidivism among those
convicted of robbery by drawing on published accounts from a sample of
eighty-six individuals actively involved in committing such offenses, many of
whom have returned to crime after being released from prison.22 Where
appropriate, these accounts are supplemented with those from active robbers
interviewed in the course of other studies.23 Offenders represent an important
source of empirical data about the perceptual forces that shape their lawbreaking. As Feeney has observed: “If headway is ever to be made in dealing
with crime, we must access the information that offenders have and use this for
purposes of prevention and control. Robbers know a lot about themselves and
about robberies that no one else knows.”24
We begin by outlining the etiological cycle that produces the vast majority
of violent predatory street crimes, including most forms of robbery, be it
personal, low-level commercial, or carjacking. Next, we explore the ways in
which this cycle influences offenders’ legal and moral decision-making. We
then consider what all of this means for our attempts to reduce recidivism
among those convicted of robbery. We conclude with policy considerations for
reducing recidivism among this group of violent offenders. Our emphasis
throughout is on the ways in which pervasive social exclusion, both a cause and
a consequence of their law-breaking, serves to constrain would-be robbers’
perceived opportunities, which itself is anchored in a realistic appreciation of
their immediate circumstances and prospects.
21. David J. Harding, Jessica J. B. Wyse, Cheyney Dobson, & Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Making
Ends Meet After Prison, 33 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 440, 441 (2014).
22. See WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 11 for a full description of the sample and
methodology.
23. See Volkan Topalli & Richard Wright, Affect and the Dynamic Foreground of Predatory
Street Crime: Desperation, Anger and Fear, in AFFECT AND COGNITION IN CRIMINAL DECISION
MAKING 42, 42, 44, 46, 49, 51–52 (Jean-Louis Van Gelder, Henk Elffers, Danielle Reynald, & Daniel
Nagin eds., 2014); Timothy Brezina, Erdal Tekin, & Volkan Topalli, “Might Not Be a Tomorrow”: A
Multimethods Approach to Anticipated Early Death and Youth Crime, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1091, 1110–
18 (2009); Bruce A. Jacobs, Volkan Topalli, & Richard Wright, Carjacking, Streetlife and Offender
Motivation, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 673, 674–84 (2003).
24. Floyd Feeney, Robbers as Decision Makers, in THE REASONING CRIMINAL: RATIONAL
CHOICE PERSPECTIVES ON OFFENDING 53, 68 (Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 2014).
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II. THE ETIOLOGICAL CYCLE OF ROBBERY25
In order to appreciate more fully the challenges of reducing recidivism
among individuals convicted of robbery, it is useful to examine the macro and
micro processes through which such offenses typically come to be
contemplated and carried out.
Figure 1 outlines the journey that most offenders take on their way from
birth to the commission of robbery.
FIGURE 1: THE ETIOLOGICAL CYCLE OF ROBBERY

Virtually all would-be robbers are born into deplorable social
circumstances.26 Their early years are marked by all manner of background
risk factors for crime, such as material deprivation, poor educational
opportunities, a lack of parental supervision, and day-to-day exposure to
violence.27
I grew up with shootin’ and fightin’ all over. You grew up with
books and shit. Where I’m from you never know if you gonna
live one minute to the next. It’s like a war out there. People
die every day. You can go to sleep and hear gunshots all night
man, all night. Bullets be lying on the street in the morning.
Ambulances and police cars steady riding through my
neighborhood, man.28

25. Portions of Parts II through IV draw on verbatim material originally published in WRIGHT &
DECKER, supra note 2. Used by permission of Northeastern University Press.
26. BRUCE WESTERN, HOMEWARD: LIFE IN THE YEAR AFTER PRISON 63 (2018); ROSEMARY J.
ERICKSON, ATHENA RESEARCH CORP., TEENAGE ROBBERS: HOW AND WHY THEY ROB 11 (2003),
http://athenaresearch.com/materials/prchs_trhwr.pdf [https://perma.cc/FER8-Y635]; JOHN M.
MACDONALD, ARMED ROBBERY: OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 132 (1975); TONY PARKER &
ROBERT ALLERTON, THE COURAGE OF HIS CONVICTIONS 21–22 (1962).
27. WESTERN, supra note 26, at 63.
28. Brezina, Tekin, & Topalli, supra note 23, at 1113.
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Of course, not everyone exposed to such conditions turns to crime—most
do not—but for some it has the effect of loosening their ties to conventional
society, essentially setting them adrift and making them vulnerable to the allure
of street life.29 A common refrain among urban mothers is that they fear losing
their sons to the streets. The imperatives of street life dictate the hedonistic
pursuit of illicit action, especially drug use, that feeds on itself and constantly
calls for more of the same.30 The idea is to live life literally as if there is no
tomorrow:
Just get high, get high. I just blow money. Money is not
something that is going to achieve for nobody, you know what
I’m saying? So everyday, there’s not a promise that there’ll be
another [day] so I just spend it, you know what I’m saying? It
ain’t mine, you know what I’m saying, I just got it, it’s just in
my possession. . . . It’s a lot of fun.31
Would-be offenders are attracted to street life partly because they regard
their legitimate prospects as grim and see no value in long-range planning.32
Participating in street life offers them a semblance of personal identity, while
allowing them to mask what Kornhauser has called their “abiding sense of
failure.”33
I really don’t dwell on things like that. One day I might not
wake up. I don’t even think about what’s important to me.
What’s important to me is getting mine . . . .34
But street life participation can only be sustained via regular infusions of
cash, thereby setting in motion the instigating conditions for predatory crime.35
The problem is that as fast as offenders get their hands on more cash, they spend
it with reckless abandon in a desperate attempt to, in their words, keep the party
going. As a result, they are almost perpetually in need of additional funds.
Just got the money to blow, so fuck it, blow it. Whatever, it
don’t even matter. Whatever you see you get, fuck it. Spend
29. Tara M. Brown, “Hitting the Streets”: Youth Street Involvement as Adaptive Well-Being, 86
HARV. EDUC. REV. 48, 65–66 (2016). Brown goes so far as to assert that for many young men, the
turn to street life is an adaptive measure aimed at promoting their well-being in the face of dire social
circumstances. Id.
30. Jacobs, Topalli & Wright, supra note 23, at 677.
31. Id.
32. WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 37.
33. RUTH ROSNER KORNHAUSER, SOCIAL SOURCES OF DELINQUENCY: AN APPRAISAL OF
ANALYTIC MODELS 131 (1978).
34. WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 37.
35. A long line of research has identified street life as productive of serious delinquency. See,
e.g., John Hagan & Bill McCarthy, Streetlife and Delinquency, 43 BRIT. J. SOC. 533, 555 (1992).
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that shit. . . . Easy come, easy go. . . . I ain’t trying to think
about keeping nothing.36
Once this happens, the offenders are in danger of becoming encapsulated
in what Lemert has described as a “dialectical, self-enclosed system[] of
behavior”37 that takes on a logic of its own to the exclusion of concerns external
to the immediate social situation.38 Seeking to prolong their hedonistic pursuit
of illicit action, they are unlikely to look for a long-term solution to their
predicament.39 Instead, they are inclined to fall back on the most “proximate
and performable”40 option realistically available to them for dealing with their
pressing need for cash, which in the case of robbers often means committing
another stick-up.
This is the socio-cultural context within which most offenders decide to
commit their robberies, with their motivation to offend emerging directly out
of a period of intense self-indulgence, coupled with a realistic appreciation of
their dire circumstances.
I’m walking around, sometimes if I have any money in my
pocket I go get high, buy a bag of [marijuana], a fortyounce . . . or something. Get high and then I ain’t got no more
money and then the highness makes you start thinking until
you go out and do [a robbery]. It just makes me upset, angry,
mad, jealous . . . cause I ain’t got the stuff that [others] got. [I
think about armed robbery when] I need some money. I like
money in my pocket, I like going out and getting drunk. When
I get drunk, I get to tripping off shit that been happening with
me, shit that been going through my life and shit [that] ain’t
right. And [doing stickups] is just how I get my satisfaction, I
guess. Just go out and just do it.41
Successfully committing a robbery, then, not only generates the
wherewithal to continue partying, it also may represent a way for offenders to
demonstrate criminal competence and expertise to themselves and others—a
chance momentarily to transcend the challenges of their daily lives by taking
control of the situation and directing the unfolding action.42
36. Jacobs, Topalli & Wright, supra note 23, at 677.
37. Edwin M. Lemert, An Isolation and Closure Theory of Naive Check Forgery, 44 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 296, 304 (1953).
38. Neal Shover & David Honaker, The Socially Bounded Decision Making of Persistent
Property Offenders, 31 HOW. J. CRIM. & JUST. 276, 283 (1992).
39. WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 39.
40. JOHN LOFLAND, DEVIANCE AND IDENTITY 61 (1969).
41. WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 36.
42. JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS IN DOING EVIL
198 (1988).
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III. THE THREAT OF LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
The threat of legal sanctions rests on an assumption that would-be offenders
perceive themselves as having freedom to choose whether or not to commit any
given crime. This assumption flies in the face of what we know about the
immediate context in which robbers “decide” to offend, with most of them
believing that their desperate need for cash cannot be deferred or met through
more conventional means. This is not to say that such offenders are unmindful
of the risk of arrest and prosecution, but rather that the perceived urgency of
their immediate situation serves to attenuate the link between law-breaking and
potential sanctions.43 Convinced they have no realistic alternative to doing a
robbery, offenders consciously employ various cognitive techniques to
neutralize the power of threatened sanctions to deter the contemplated
offense.44 Most commonly this involves simply refusing to dwell on the
possibility of being caught, which obviously precludes the need to worry about
the contingent risks of prosecution and punishment.45
[The risk of getting caught is] just a reality. I know it’s a
possibility. But I try not to think about that because if I dwell
on it too much I may talk myself or scare myself out of doing
[the robbery].46
Whereas some offenders reportedly find it easy to avoid thinking about
getting caught,47 others clearly have to work hard to keep such thoughts out of
their minds.
I try to keep [thoughts about getting caught] out of my mind. I
look at it more on a positive side: getting away. A lot of times
it enters my head about getting caught, but I try to kill that
thought by saying I can do it; have confidence in pulling the
job off.48
Some offenders go so far as to drink or use drugs before an offense in a
deliberate attempt to dull the impact of threatened sanctions, thereby allowing
them to proceed without worrying about the potential consequences.

43. GLENN D. WALTERS, THE CRIMINAL LIFESTYLE: PATTERNS OF SERIOUS CRIMINAL
CONDUCT 145 (1990); WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 129.
44. TREVOR BENNETT & RICHARD WRIGHT, BURGLARS ON BURGLARY: PREVENTION AND THE
OFFENDER 115 (1984).
45. Id. at 116; Neal Shover, Aging Criminals: Changes in the Criminal Calculus, in IN THEIR
OWN WORDS: CRIMINALS ON CRIME 57, 60 (Paul Cromwell ed., 1996).
46. WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 119.
47. See BENNETT & WRIGHT, supra note 44, at 115.
48. WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 119.
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That’s why [my partners and I] get high so much. [We] get
high and get stupid, then we don’t trip off of [the threat of
apprehension]. Whatever happens, happens. . . . You just
don’t care at the time.”49
Regardless of whether would-be offenders find it easy or difficult to avoid
thinking about threatened sanctions, the important point is that at the time of
actually contemplating a robbery, few of them see themselves as having any
other realistic course of action and so “choose” simply to ignore the risks. As
Wright and Decker observe: “Where no viable alternative to crime exists, there
clearly is little point in dwelling on the potentially negative consequences of
offending.”50
Although in the minority, some would-be robbers do think about the
possibility of getting caught but proceed anyway. Why does an awareness of
this risk fail to deter them from offending? Here again, a large part of the
answer can be found in their financial desperation, which encourages them to
discount danger and concentrate instead on the anticipated reward. An active
armed robber interviewed by Wright and Decker explained his lengthy prison
record this way: “[I always think about the possibility of apprehension, but] I
guess the need is greater than the fear of getting caught.”51
Even offenders who, during their crimes, are attuned to the possibility of
arrest and prosecution tend to regard that risk as so small for any given offense
that it easily can be discounted in the face of their pressing need for quick
cash—a process made easier still by the fact that many of them have an
overblown opinion of their skill at avoiding detection.52
Definitely! It depends. I don’t know. What I’m really trying
to say [is that] if you good at what you doing, you don’t care
too much cause you figure nine times out of ten you not gonna
get caught.”53
Whether one in ten odds of getting caught are good or bad is open to debate,
but surely it depends in part on the perceived severity of the resultant sanction—
a calculation shaped by the individual’s current circumstances and prospects.
Most persistent robbers know full well that their law-breaking is going to land
them in prison sooner or later. Yet they carry on despite the mounting risk of
apprehension. Recall that most such offenders experience themselves as locked
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 120.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 122.
WALTERS, supra note 43, at 88; WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 122.
WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 122.
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into a grim cycle of events that is leading them nowhere.54 Against that
backdrop, the prospect of a stint in prison may come to be seen almost as a
welcome break from the emotional turmoil and physical danger that are part
and parcel of life on the street.
Basically jail fun for real. Most people look at jail [as a bad
place]. I look at jail as another place to lay my head at. I might
be safer in jail than on the streets.55
The bottom line is that virtually all robbers know full well that committing
stick-ups carries the risk of apprehension and punishment. While actually
engaged in an offense, however, most of them are able to avoid worrying about
the potentially negative consequences simply by refusing to think about them.
In doing so, they display a remarkable talent consciously to manipulate “the
legal bind of the law.”56 No doubt this ability is facilitated by their perceived
desperate need for cash. Lofland has observed that all types of desperation have
a tendency to produce “psychosocial encapsulation,” wherein individuals enter
a “qualitatively different state of mind” in which the potentially negative
consequences of their actions become attenuated.57 Even offenders who, during
their robberies, do think about the chance of getting caught often are
encouraged by financial pressures to discount that risk and concentrate instead
on the anticipated reward. As Wright and Decker remind us, “the reason for
contemplating [an offense] in the first place often serves to diminish the
perceived threat of official sanctions.”58
IV. CONSCIENCE AND ANTICIPATED FEELINGS OF GUILT
The risk of incurring legal sanctions is not the only perceptual mechanism
that conceivably could deter would-be robbers from committing an offense.
54. Id. at 36.
55. Id. at 123. Studies on the imprisonment-mortality link lend credence to such sentiments.
Collectively, they demonstrate that former inmates are at higher risk for death after release from prison;
mostly due to drug overdoses, suicide, violence, and a lapse in medical treatment for chronic health
conditions. See, e.g., Ingrid A. Binswanger, Marc F. Stern, Richard A. Deyo, Patrick K. Heagerty,
Allen Cheadle, Joann G. Elmore, & Thomas D. Koepsell, Release from Prison — A High Risk of Death
for Former Inmates, 356 N. ENG. J. MED. 157, 159–61 (2007); Mark Jones, Gregory D. Kearney,
Xiaohui Xu, Tammy Norwood, & Scott K. Proescholdbell, Mortality Rates and Cause of Death Among
Former Prison Inmates in North Carolina, 78 N.C. MED. J. 223, 226 (2017); Anne C. Spaulding, Ryan
M. Seals, Victoria A. McCallum, Sebastian D. Perez, Amanda K. Brzozowski, & N. Kyle Steenland,
Prisoner Survival Inside and Outside of the Institution: Implications for Health-Care Planning, 173
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 479, 483–85 (2011).
56. BENNETT & WRIGHT, supra note 44, at 116 (emphasis omitted).
57. LOFLAND, supra note 40, at 50.
58. WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 124 (internal citation omitted).
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Virtually everybody, robbers included, knows that sticking a gun in someone’s
face and ordering them to hand over their possessions is morally suspect. That
being so, anticipated feelings of guilt also might serve to dissuade potential
offenders from acting on their intentions, at least in theory. In practice,
however, the overwhelming majority of robbers typically experience little guilt
during their offenses.
I have never felt no pain for nobody. . . . That’s how I was
raised up. . . . My father always told me never to feel no pity
for nobody. So I don’t feel no pity for nobody. I just don’t
[feel any guilt]. Ain’t no love on the streets. I don’t care about
nobody. I don’t care about nothing but me and my family.59
Undoubtedly, the offenders’ lack of guilt can be attributed in large part to
situational pressures, namely a desperate need for quick cash to sustain the
hedonistic action promoted by street life. But it also can be attributed to the
predatory nature of street life itself, which profoundly shapes the moral
universe of its members, serving to isolate them further still from the professed
norms and values of conventional society.60 In their view, getting robbed is just
one of life’s risks—it could (and sometimes did) happen to them too—and
frankly is no big deal.
It’s like this, you never know, somebody probably do me like
that. That’s why we don’t feel guilty. It might happen to us.
You know the chance you taking. You could get robbed just
as quick as anybody else could. . . . So it’s an even
proposition, I think. . . . I just don’t feel sorry [for my victims].
I been robbed before and I feel like, if somebody rob me, they
ain’t gonna feel sorry when they rob me, so I don’t feel sorry
for nobody.61
Whatever the reason, the fact remains that at the time of actually
contemplating their crimes most would-be robbers cannot realistically be
constrained by internalized moral beliefs—they simply do not feel guilty.
V. RECIDIVISM MEETS REALITY
What light does this brief summary of how would-be robbers think and act
in real life settings and circumstances shed on our prospects for reducing
recidivism among those convicted of such crimes? Obviously, the threat of
another prison term is not sufficient to deter all of them. Many of the active

59. Id. at 125.
60. Id. at 126.
61. Id.
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robbers quoted above have served time in the past and yet returned to crime
upon release.
The first thing to say is that robbers do not contemplate and carry out their
offenses in a socio-cultural vacuum. Most of them come to the offending
moment with a host of more or less static background risk factors that have
severely limited their realistic life choices from the beginning.62 Those who
have been released after serving time for robbery share these same risk factors,
plus another one in the form of a prison record for having committed a
racialized and widely-feared violent crime, which further restricts their already
scarce options.
As the name implies, risk factors are not causal, but they do serve to
circumscribe the interactional environment within which potential robbers
assess their current circumstances and prospects. Given that the odds of
achieving conventional success are stacked so heavily against them, it is
unsurprising that those released from prison are especially vulnerable to being
seduced by the hedonistic imperatives of street life, which promise immediate
gratification. Not all ex-convicts succumb to the temptation, but those who do
must find a way to sustain the illicit action, so-called “partying,” that attracted
them to street life in the first place. This can quickly lock them into a selfreinforcing criminogenic cycle—partying leads to financial desperation which
leads to crime which leads to more partying.63 In the process, they become
isolated further still from the norms and expectations of conventional society,
which in turn makes it increasingly harder for them to break out of the cycle.
In the immediate situation of their crimes, most robbers, with or without a
prison record, perceive themselves as having little choice but to commit a stickup, which is why it is so difficult to reduce recidivism among offenders already
caught up in street life. Probably a better strategy is to prevent them from
getting back into street life in the first place. Urban mothers long have sought
to inoculate their sons against the dangerous allure of the streets; it is incumbent
on us to try to do the same for ex-prisoners. They too can be lost to the streets,
whereupon their odds of returning to crime rise correspondingly.64
The goal, then, is to undermine the seductive pull of street life among a
group of serious violent ex-convicts, most of whom entered prison with few ties

62. See supra Figure 1.
63. See supra Figure 1.
64. JEREMY TRAVIS, AMY L. SOLOMON, & MICHELLE WAUL, URBAN INST., JUSTICE POLICY
CTR., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 1
(2001), http://research.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from_prison_to_home.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DW82NWP].

WRIGHT_20APR20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1192

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

4/20/2020 11:06 PM

[103:1179

to conventional society and left it with fewer still.65 But this is easier said than
done. How do you reintegrate those who were not—and never have been—
integrated to begin with? One thing is certain, the scale and scope of such an
undertaking are beyond the remit of the justice system.
The justice system is tasked with reducing crime through the deterrence and
incapacitation of lawbreakers, not by alleviating the socio-cultural conditions
that gave rise to their lawbreaking. When it comes to countering the allure of
street life for robbers released from prison, the justice system has few realistic
options beyond surveillance, such as using the threat of random drug tests in an
attempt to deter them. Those threats are backed up by the prospect of being
sent back to prison for those who fail for reasons of technical violations, who
account for almost 30% of all prison admissions nationwide.66 Put differently,
the justice system has some sticks with which to try to undermine the magnetic
pull of street life, but as Freeman warns, that is the easy part.67 The much
tougher challenge is the carrot part; building sturdy links to legitimate others
and activities, which is not something the criminal justice system is equipped
to do. Western echoes Freeman’s warning, but he goes further in arguing that
criminal justice policy may actually make it harder to forge such links:
The mission of social integration in the aftermath of crime
creates a broad test for criminal justice policy: does it
encourage community membership or does it deepen social
exclusion? Many staples of American criminal justice fail this
test. Fines and fees for cost recovery, pretrial detention for
want of bail, criminal record disqualifications for government
benefits, revocations of probation and parole for technical
violations—all fail the test of social integration.68
He concludes that, in the end, “[c]riminal justice is a poor instrument for social
policy because at its core, it is a blaming institution.”69

65. See Shover, supra note 45, at 60–61.
66. BRONSON & CARSON, supra note 19, at 13; David J. Harding, Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Anh P.
Nguyen, & Shawn D. Bushway, Short- and Long-term Effects of Imprisonment on Future Felony
Convictions and Prison Admissions, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 11103, 11103 (2017).
67. Richard B. Freeman, Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What
Might We Do About It?, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 40–41 (1996).
68. WESTERN, supra note 26, at 185.
69. Id.
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VI. PRIMUM EST UT NON NOCERE70
In terms of what the criminal justice system realistically might do to reduce
recidivism among those discharged from prison for robbery, we believe that a
guiding principle should be “first, do no harm.” It is true that one of that
system’s primary responsibilities involves apportioning blame and meting out
punishment to law-breakers, but this does not necessarily mean that it has
nothing to offer when it comes to fostering the broader goal of social inclusion.
It does so whenever it extends the benefits of justice to those previously left
out. The police are the primary point of contact with the criminal justice system
for individuals recently released from prison; they encounter police officers far
more often than probation or parole officers. As such, the police have a
potentially critical role in helping to build trust with them, especially when it
comes to criminal victimization. The substantial overlap between offenders
and victims is well-documented, though many such offenses go unreported
because the police are perceived to be hostile or indifferent to crimes committed
against individuals who themselves are involved in law-breaking.71 One way
to promote the social inclusion of ex-convicts is for the police to take them
seriously as crime victims, even when the offense committed against them
occurred in the context of their own criminal conduct.72 At a minimum this
means allowing them—perhaps even encouraging them—to make a police
report without fear of legal repercussions.73
Recognizing that law cannot fully serve those who perceive it to be
unavailable, several cities across the U.S. have worked to improve access to
justice system services for criminally-involved victims. For example, given the
high rates of street violence faced by sex workers,74 civic leaders in San
Francisco implemented a policy allowing them to report such offenses to the
police without fear of being taken into custody, even if the crime occurred in

70. THOMAS INMAN, FOUNDATION FOR A NEW THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 352 (2nd
ed. 1861).
71. WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 65–66.
72. See SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE
URBAN POOR 175 (2006). Police have already displayed a willingness to secure justice for nontraditional victims and their families as all homicides, for example, are investigated, even if they occur
in criminal contexts.
73. Richard Rosenfeld, Bruce A. Jacobs, & Richard Wright, Snitching and the Code of the Street,
43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 291, 307–08 (2003).
74. For a review, see C. Gabrielle Salfati, Alison R. James, & Lynn Ferguson, Prostitute
Homicides: A Descriptive Study, 23 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 505, 506 (2008).
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the course of their own law-breaking.75 Similar measures have been employed
in an attempt to reduce offenses committed against undocumented immigrants,
a group highly susceptible to criminal victimization. Take the cases of Los
Angeles and Houston, where fear of deportation was blamed for low levels of
crime reporting among migrants.76 This led local law enforcement to adopt a
policy prohibiting officers from inquiring about the legal status of persons
coming forward with information about a crime.77
Despite high rates of criminal victimization among those convicted of
robbery,78 garnering political support for an initiative that allows them to report
crimes without putting themselves in legal jeopardy will not be easy.79 The
report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing acknowledged
this and recommended that police agencies take proactive steps to promote
public trust by initiating positive, non-enforcement activities in communities
that have been heavily policed.80 Efforts such as the International Association
of Chiefs of Police’s (IACP’s) Community-Police Relations, which aims to
provide guidance to law enforcement agencies seeking to increase community
confidence, recognize the role of policing in building trust with the
communities they serve and thereby build political support for initiatives that
would encourage victims to report crimes without fear of reprisal.81

75. Hannah Albarazi, San Francisco Sex Workers Reporting Violent Crimes Won’t Face Arrest,
CBS (Jan. 11, 2018), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2018/01/11/san-francisco-sex-workers-wontface-arrest/ [https://perma.cc/6DFM-CY6Z].
76. James Queally, Fearing Deportation, Many Domestic Violence Victims Are Steering Clear
of Police and Courts, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lnundocumented-crime-reporting-20171009-story.html [https://perma.cc/H24Z-ZMTV].
77. Id.
78. About half of robbery offenders held in state prisons in 2004 reported that someone had used
a weapon against them prior to their admission into prison, 40% reported having been beaten up, and
half had been injured. See generally SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES, supra note 20.
79. Kenneth Dowler, Media Consumption and Public Attitudes Toward Crime and Justice: The
Relationship Between Fear of Crime, Punitive Attitudes, and Perceived Police Effectiveness, 10 J.
CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 109, 111 (2003). The public generally supports “tough-on-crime”
policies for offenses that elicit the greatest fear (e.g., robbery), making “no-arrest assurances” for those
involved in criminal violence a tough sell.
80. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., FINAL REPORT OF PRESIDENT’S TASK
FORCE
ON
21ST
CENTURY
POLICING
14
(2015),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS3R-63JF].
81. Institute for Community-Police Relations, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF
POLICE,
https://www.theiacp.org/projects/institute-for-community-police-relations
[https://perma.cc/CZ4V-THCD].

WRIGHT_20APR20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

4/20/2020 11:06 PM

1195

But these efforts are focused on long-run changes and improvements to
police-community relations. In the short-run, we doubt that the armed robbers
we have described, who are disconnected from mainstream society and
distrustful of authority, would be willing to ask the police for help. Many such
individuals subscribe to a strict “no snitching” code, preferring instead to deal
with those who victimize them on their own.82 Perhaps as a first step, law
enforcement could simply refer aggrieved lawbreakers to victim services,
thereby giving them a legitimate outlet for coping with the trauma of
victimization without violating the “non-cooperation clause” of the street code.
Not only might this further the cause of social inclusion for ex-convicts, it also
might help to prevent their re-involvement in crime by lessening the desire to
take matters into their own hands.
Staying with the principle of “do no harm,” it may make sense to scale back
extralegal supervision stipulations for newly-released convicts, including those
who have served time for robbery and other violent crimes. Intensive
surveillance-based re-entry programs requiring things such as electronic
monitoring and random urine testing are intended to help newly released
prisoners transition to a crime-free lifestyle.83 The effectiveness of these
programs remains open to debate,84 although the emerging view seems to be
that increasing the intensity of community supervision has no public safety
benefits and can lead to increases in recidivism.85
Intensive supervision also may carry a host of collateral consequences,
including putting ex-convicts at higher risk of recidivism, with parole
revocations accounting for more than a quarter of all prison admissions.86 A
substantial portion of these revocations involve non-criminal violations that
82. ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF
CITY 321 (1999); Volkan Topalli, Richard Wright, & Robert Fornango, Drug Dealers,
Robbery and Retaliation: Vulnerability, Deterrence and the Contagion of Violence, 42 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 337, 340 (2002).
83. See Mary A. Finn & Suzanne Muirhead-Steves, The Effectiveness of Electronic Monitoring
with Violent Male Parolees, 19 JUST. Q. 293, 294 (2002).
84. Joan Petersilia, Community Corrections: Probation, Parole, and Prisoner Reentry, in CRIME
AND PUBLIC POLICY 499, 502 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011); see James Bonta, Tanya
Rugge, Terri-Lynne Scott, Guy Bourgon, & Annie K. Yessine, Exploring the Black Box of Community
Supervision, 47 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 248, 265–68 (2008); Finn & Muirhead-Steves, supra
note 83, at 297, 307, 309; Cheryl Lero Jonson & Francis T. Cullen, Prisoner Reentry Programs, 44
CRIME & JUST. 517, 558 (2015).
85. JENNIFER L. DOLEAC, IZA – INST. OF LABOR ECON., STRATEGIES TO PRODUCTIVELY
REINCORPORATE THE FORMERLY-INCARCERATED INTO COMMUNITIES: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF
THE LITERATURE 39 (2018), http://ftp.iza.org/dp11646.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT5Q-QQMY].
86. See generally OFFENSES KNOWN AND CLEARANCES BY ARREST, 2015, supra note 11.
THE INNER

WRIGHT_20APR20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1196

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

4/20/2020 11:06 PM

[103:1179

often have nothing to do with the original charge (e.g., missing an appointment
or drug use), ultimately creating a “separate path to prison for large numbers of
former prisoners.”87 On top of this, although a violent reputation might bolster
a convict’s standing in prison, on the outside, such “carceral apparatus” serve
only to extend the stigma of incarceration that fosters social exclusion, further
diminishing his or her chances of successful social integration.88
Matters such as these assume particular salience when thinking about
tackling recidivism among convicted robbers, given that their complex
criminogenic profile has left them resistant to cognitive-behavioral therapy
(CBT) and other highly-touted interventions. For example, a line of studies
evaluating the crime-suppressing benefits of CBT consistently shows that the
offending propensities of convicted robbers are unresponsive to treatment.89
Wilson, Attrill, and Nugent maintain that along with problem-solving and selfmanagement deficits, many convicted robbers have other criminogenic needs
and urges, things like drug and alcohol dependency, that are far more
consequential to their decision making.90 Others have speculated that the
questionable moral convictions, heedless pursuit of autonomy, and aspirations
for a party lifestyle characteristic of such offenders also might dwarf the impact
of CBT.91 It is difficult to imagine that a well-intentioned risk-needsresponsivity model involving an hour or two a month of meetings with a parole
officer could counter the allure of the streets and successfully integrate armed
robbers into conventional society.92
87. JEREMY TRAVIS & SARAH LAWRENCE, URBAN INST., JUSTICE POLICY CTR., BEYOND THE
PRISON
GATES:
THE
STATE
OF
PAROLE
IN
AMERICA
24
(2002),
http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310583_Beyond_prison_gates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AUY4-GA6T]; see also Merry Morash, Deborah A. Kashy, Sandi W. Smith, &
Jennifer E. Cobbina, Technical Violations, Treatment and Punishment Responses, and Recidivism of
Women on Probation and Parole, 30 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 788, 789 (2017).
88. See Terri A. Winnick & Mark Bodkin, Anticipated Stigma and Stigma Management Among
Those to Be Labeled “Ex-Con”, 29 DEVIANT BEHAV. 295, 296 (2008).
89. DAVID ROBINSON, CORR. SERV. CAN., THE IMPACT OF COGNITIVE SKILLS TRAINING ON
POST-RELEASE RECIDIVISM AMONG CANADIAN FEDERAL OFFENDERS 73 (1995); Rosie Travers, Ruth
E. Mann, & Clive R. Hollin, Who Benefits from Cognitive Skills Programs?: Differential Impact by
Risk and Offense Type, 41 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1103, 1127 (2014); see Sally Wilson, Gill Attrill, &
Francis Nugent, Effective Interventions for Acquisitive Offenders: An Investigation of Cognitive Skills
Programmes, 8 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 83, 96 (2003).
90. Wilson, Attrill, & Nugent, supra note 89, at 85–86.
91. ROBINSON, supra note 89, at 73; Travers, Mann, & Hollin, supra note 89, at 1125.
92. See, e.g., Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Rehabilitation and Treatment Programs,
in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 84, at 293, 295; NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5–6 (2015). On parole officer
caseloads and supervision, see THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
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In an attempt to minimize the collateral damage that can result from
intensive supervision, advocates and practitioners have called for reducing the
use and duration of community supervision, limiting and tailoring conditions
of supervision to a parolee’s risks and needs, giving community supervision
officers greater authority to modify conditions as need to adjust to behavior,
and adopting evidence-based practices in trustworthy ways.93 In line with this
theme of minimizing harm, the state of California, as one example, has
implemented non-revocable parole (NRP), an alternative parole regime absent
the standard post-release requirements responsible for landing scores of exinmates back in prison on technical violations (e.g., breaking curfew).94
Significantly, however, those convicted of robbery are ineligible for NRP.95
VII. THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The criminal justice system has never operated under the principle of “first,
do no harm” and few would regard social inclusion as part of its core mission.
Getting the criminal justice system to function as such when it comes to the
policing and parole supervision of robbery offenders is a tall order, with
JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF PAROLE SUPERVISING AGENCIES, 2006, at 1 (2008),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cspsa06.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TQU-2HEV], BILL BURRELL,
CASELOAD STANDARDS FOR PROBATION AND PAROLE 1 (2006), https://www.appanet.org/eweb/docs/APPA/stances/ip_CSPP.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XZT-J9PP], and ERIN JACOBS
VALENTINE, LOUISA TRESKON, & CINDY REDCROSS, MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH
CORP., IMPLEMENTING THE NEXT GENERATION OF PAROLE SUPERVISION: FINDINGS FROM THE
CHANGING ATTITUDES AND MOTIVATION IN PAROLEES PILOT STUDY, at iv (2018),
https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/CHAMPS_full%20report_FINAL_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2J78-9BCC].
93. HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL, TOWARD AN APPROACH TO COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: CONSENSUS DOCUMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE SESSION ON COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONS
3
(2017),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/wiener/programs/pcj/files/Consensus_Final2.
pdf [https://perma.cc/FGG6-32TT]; WENDY STILL, BARBARA BRODERICK, & STEVEN RAPHAEL,
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW THINKING IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS:
BUILDING TRUST AND LEGITIMACY WITHIN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 4 (2016),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249946.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BV76-5WYP];
MORRIS L.
THIGPEN, THOMAS J. BEAUCLAIR, GEORGE M. KEISER, & CATHY BANKS, NAT’L INSTIT. OF CORR.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PAROLE ESSENTIALS: PRACTICAL GUIDES FOR PAROLE LEADERS: THE
FUTURE OF PAROLE AS A KEY PARTNER IN ASSURING PUBLIC SAFETY 1 (2011),
https://info.nicic.gov/nicrp/system/files/024201.pdf [https://perma.cc/H57L-4C6E]; Cecelia Klingele,
Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1020–21
(2013); Edward E. Rhine, Joan Petersilia, & Kevin R. Reitz, Improving Parole Release in America, 28
FED. SENT’G REP. 96, 96 (2015).
94. Sara Mayeux, The Origins of Back-End Sentencing in California: A Dispatch from the
Archives, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 529, 532 (2011).
95. Id.; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3505(a)(2) (2020).
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formidable and perhaps insurmountable obstacles to success. Such a change
would require a fundamental reorientation of criminal justice policies and
priorities, which place strong emphasis on enforcement, sanctioning, and public
safety. We do not realistically see that happening anytime soon. For example,
contrary to emerging evidence that intensive supervision is counterproductive,
initiatives such as the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI), the major effort in
the U.S. over the past decade to address the growth of imprisonment, has
embraced more supervision, especially for prisoners who “max out” or serve
their entire term in prison and do not have a period of post-release community
supervision.96 The JRI also has not addressed the issue of violent offenders,
except to acknowledge that prison should be reserved for serious and high-risk
offenders such as armed robbers.97
Indeed, the U.S. experience over the past three decades has been one of
increasing the severity of enforcement and sentencing for robbers, even as the
robbery rate has declined by more than half since the early 1990s. Both of the
national sources of data on crime—the National Crime Victimization Survey
(NCVS) and the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)—show that the number and
rate of robberies declined considerably from the early 1990s through today.
The NCVS reports fewer than 600,000 robbery victimizations in 2018, down
by more than half from 1.75 million in 1993.98 Put differently, over this period,
the NCVS robbery victimization rate declined by more than one-third from 8.3
to 2.1 per 1,000, with most of the decline occurring between 1993 and
2002(04).99 Trends in the UCR’s robbery offenses follow a similar pattern, but
the UCR count is about half that of the NCVS, due in part to victimizations that
are not reported to the police.100 In 2017 for example, the UCR reported
320,000 robberies, and the UCR robbery rate stood at about 1 per 1,000.101

96. NANCY LA VIGNE, SAMANTHA HARVELL, JEREMY WELSH-LOVEMAN, HANNA LOVE, JULIA
DURNAN, JOSH EISENSTAT, LAURA GOLIAN, EDDIE MOHR, ELIZABETH PELLETIER, JULIE SAMUELS,
CHELSEA THOMSON, & MARGARET ULLE, URBAN INSTIT., REFORMING SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS POLICY: THE EXPERIENCE OF JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE STATES 24 (2016).
97. Id. at 19.
98. NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool (NVAT), supra note 10.
99. Id.
100. Unif. Crime Reporting Program, Table 16: Rate: Number of Crimes per 100,000
Inhabitants by Population Group, 2017, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-inthe-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-16 [https://perma.cc/8BND-RBU2].
101. Id.
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As the robbery crime rate declined, enforcement increased. In 1993, about
one-quarter of the UCR robberies resulted in arrest; by 2017, just under 30%
did.102
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FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF ROBBERY OFFENSES AND ARREST PER OFFENSE,
1991–2017103

Robbery offenses (part 1)
Robbery arrests per offense
Linear (Robbery arrests per offense)

Remembering that not all robberies are reported to the police, by 2017,
robbery arrests as a percent of all NCVS robbery victimizations reached 15%,
up from 10% in 1993.104 If arrested, the chances that a robbery offender would
be committed to state prison on a felony conviction for a new crime also

102. See infra Figure 2.
103. See
Arrest
Data
Analysis
Tool,
BUREAU
JUST.
STAT.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm# [https://perma.cc/YCJ3-7X67]
(follow the “National Estimates” hyperlink; select “Trend Tables by Sex” as the table type; select “All
Ages” as the age category; select the “Both Sexes” check box; select “Robbery” as the offense type;
select years “1990 through 2014”; and select the “Make Rates Table”) [hereinafter Arrest Data
Analysis Tool]. Arrest rates for 2015 and 2016 were calculated by analyzing Uniform Crime Reports
data. This information is on file with the authors and are available on request.
104. These statistics were calculated by analyzing National Crime Victimization Survey and the
Uniform Crime Reports data. This information is on file with the authors and is available upon request.
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increased.105 Nationwide, the ratio of new court commitments of adult robbery
offenders to arrests of adult robbery offenders increased from 21% in 1991 to
35% in 2014, after which it declined slightly.106
FIGURE 3: ROBBERY ENFORCEMENT RATIOS: ARRESTS TO OFFENSES AND NEW
107
COURT COMMITMENTS TO ADULT ARRESTS, 1991–2017
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The mean length of time that robbery offenders entering state prison on a
new court commitment could expect to serve increased from 1990 to 2010. In
1990, it was about three years; by 2005 it was more than five years.108 Mean
time for all robbery offenders released from prison from a new court

105. COMM. ON LAW AND JUSTICE, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION

IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 51 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western,

& Steve Redburn eds., 2014).
106. See infra Figure 3. The aggregate, national-level pattern in the probability of a prison
commitment given arrest is consistent with the patterns in the Nation’s 75 largest counties. There,
59% of robbery arrestees are convicted of a felony and of these, 71% are sentenced to prison. The
probability that a robbery arrestee in these counties was sentenced to prison was 42%. This is slightly
higher than the 35% we calculated as the new court commitment to arrest ratio. Differences in samples
used can account for the higher probability in large urban vs. all other jurisdictions.
107. Arrest Data Analysis Tool, supra note 103.
108. COMM. ON LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 105, at 54.
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commitment was 4.7 years in 2016.109 This equaled the expected time served
on a new court commitment, indicating some stability in the robbery prison
population.110
These changes in enforcement practices occurred both as the number of
robberies declined and the severity of robbery did not increase, as measured by
weapon use and victim injury. Rather, these attributes of robbery victimizations
remained as relatively constant proportions of all robbery victimizations. For
example, in 1993, 49% of robbery victimizations involved a weapon, according
to victims’ accounts; while the percentage fluctuated during the intervening
years, by 2017 51% of the robbery victimizations involved a weapon. The
percent reporting injury increased from 29% to 33%, but these point estimates
were not statistically significant.111
This all adds up to a 70% increase in the number of sentenced robbery
offenders in state prisons, from 99,200 in 1990 to 168,800 in 2016.112 The 2016
number of robbers reflects a 9% decrease from the 186,000 held in 2009.113
The decline in robbery offenders in state prisons since 2009 occurred as
admissions fell faster than releases.114 In sum, the criminal justice system
response to a fall in robbery offending rates (as measured by both the UCR and
NCVS) has been to increase the scale of enforcement, as measured by the arrest
to offense rate and the likelihood of going to prison given an arrest, with
relatively little change in the severity of punishment.
When you stop to think about the scale of robbery offending and the number
of robbery prisoners, it is difficult not to conclude that the enforcement efforts
directed at robbery offenders have been driven largely by incapacitation. This
could reflect the fact that trying to deter robbery offenders by increasing
109. DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TIME
SERVED IN STATE PRISON, 2016, at 2 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D899-9KU4].
110. Evelyn J. Patterson & Samuel H. Preston, Estimating Mean Length of Stay in Prison:
Methods and Applications, 24 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 33, 38 (2008).
111. NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool (NVAT), supra note 10.
112. JAN M. CHAIKEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995, at
9
(1997),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpius951.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8VP-GCS4]; BRONSON &
CARSON, supra note 19, at 22.
113. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 27 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9G2Z-N77H].
114. These statistics were calculated by analyzing the Bureau of Justice Statistics National
Prisoners Statistics and National Corrections Reporting Program data. This information is on file with
the authors and is available upon request.
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sanctions does little or nothing to affect their decision-making at the moment
of the crime. Rather, through incapacitation, the temptation and opportunity
for them to make such a decision are removed altogether for the period of
incarceration, at least outside the confines of the prison’s walls.115 What is
more, the lengthy sentences associated with incapacitation may positively
influence the robbery offenders’ criminal calculus by holding them long enough
to begin to age out of crime.
The scale of the enforcement and sanctioning of robbery relative to the
number of offenses and offenders also makes an incapacitation strategy a
particularly seductive approach to the prevention of robbery. For example, if
the mean number of robberies committed by robbers in prison was three per
year, that would amount to more than half a million robberies prevented per
year.
What would make incapacitation less seductive was if the rate of
replacement of robbery offenders by new entrants was high. But this does not
seem to be the case. Despite the enhanced intensity of enforcement and
sanctioning of robbery described above, the composition of new versus repeat
robbery offenders has remained reasonably stable over time, at least in the
large, urban counties.116 BJS data show that in 1992 and 2009, about 30% of
robbery arrestees charged in court had no prior arrests, and in both years,
roughly 40% had no prior felony arrests.117 The percent of robbery arrestees
with no prior convictions increased from 42% to 48%.118 Using either prior
arrests or prior convictions as a measure of new entrants into robbery, the
composition of new entrants and repeat robbery offenders has remained fairly
constant over time, even as the total number of robbery offenders apprehended
has declined along with the decline in the number of robbery offenses.
Before closing, it is worth pointing out that despite increases in enforcement
and sentence severity, recidivism rates for robbery have remained constant.
According to BJS reports, for example, robbery offenders released from prison
in 1983, 1994, and 2005 and then tracked for at least three years had

115. WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 2, at 60. Many offenders remain committed to the
criminogenic norms and values of street culture while incarcerated, leading them to commit offenses
against fellow inmates.
116. See supra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.
117. BRIAN A. REAVES & PHENY Z. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1992, at 10–12 (1995),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Feldef92.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FTK-CTFR].
118. Id. at 12–13.
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comparable, three-year post-release re-arrest rates of between 66% and 70%.119
Reconviction rates for the 1983 and 1994 cohorts also were comparable at about
47%–48%.120 We do not intend to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of
programs designed to reduce recidivism among robbery offenders during these
years. We simply observe that despite the changes that have occurred,
aggregate robbery recidivism rates have remained constant.
To end, we have argued that the justice system can help to integrate
offenders into mainstream society by extending the benefits of justice to armed
robbers. But we also have admitted that doing this presents huge challenges
that are unlikely to be overcome in the foreseeable future. At the same time,
we have suggested that enhanced enforcement and incapacitation have inherent
appeal as a social control strategy for robbery, one of the nation’s most feared
crimes. If we juxtapose enhanced social inclusion with enhanced social control
as competing ways in which we might respond to offender recidivism in
robbery, we have little doubt that representatives of the criminal justice system
would opt for incapacitation. But this conclusion merely points to our central
thesis, that the justice system is not primarily an institution of social inclusion.
Putting aside questions of whether it should continue to respond to robbery
through the incapacitation strategy described herein, we cannot think of a way
to dissuade justice officials from choosing to do so.

119. ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE,
RECIDIVISM
OF
PRISONERS
RELEASED
IN
1983,
at
5
(1989),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB5B-Y4JJ]; LANGAN & LEVIN,
supra note 16, at 8; DUROSE, COOPER, & SNYDER, supra note 16, at 8.
120. BECK & SHIPLEY, supra note 119, at 5; LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 16, at 8. The BJS
report on recidivism of prisoners released in 2005 only reported reconviction rates for broad classes of
offenses, such as all violent offenders, but it did not report the rates for robbery offenders, as the prior
two BJS recidivism reports did. See generally DUROSE, COOPER, & SNYDER, supra note 16. However,
the 3-year reconviction rate for violent offenders released in 2005 was 45%, up from the 40% rate of
the 1994 cohort. Id. at 14; LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 16, at 8. Meanwhile the 3-year rearrest rate
for robbery offenders released in 2005 was 67% as compared to 70% for those released in 1994.
DUROSE, COOPER, & SNYDER, supra note 16, at 8; LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 16, at 8. If a
comparable 67% of rearrested robbery offenders in 2005 were reconvicted, the robbery reconviction
rate for the 2005 cohort would be about 47% also.

